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Amateur content production, networked innovation and innovation policy
Abstract
The central common feature of a number of recent technological developments 
(collectively referred to as Web 2.0) is collaborative production of content on an 
amateur  basis,  that  is,  for  motives  other  than  commercial  reward.  Amateur 
production of content generates significant external benefits that are shared by 
society in general. Indeed the amateur production of various types of content is 
probably  more  socially  beneficial  since  it  is  typically  given  away  free  The 
individual  and  social  benefits  of  such  activity  therefore  justify  public  policy 
responses to the opportunity now before us.2
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Amateur content production and innovation policy
Introduction
Innovation is a central distinguishing feature of modernity. Most attention 
has been focused on the the discovery and diffusion of technical innovation. Yet 
modern  societies  are  also  characterised  by  distinctive  processes  of  cultural 
innovation.
Over the last two decades, both technical and cultural innovation have 
been transformed by the spectacular growth of the combination of information 
technology,  communications  systems  and  social  networks  that  constitute  the 
Internet, and its most notable manifestation, the World Wide Web.
A  striking  feature  of  the  current  era  is  the  extent  to  which  notable 
innovations have been driven by concerns unrelated to, and often antithetical to, 
the desire for commercial returns. These concerns may be described as ‘amateur’, 
a term that has shifted status from favorable to pejorative, and is now in the 
process of shifting back.
Even in the commercial sector, there is no obvious relationship between 
the social value of an innovation and the returns to the innovator. The creators of 
the Internet, the World Wide Web and vital building blocks such as the Linux 
operating system received much acclaim but little or no financial return, while 
the  promoters  of  short-lived  and  ultimately  unsound  business  ideas  have 
regularly walked away with tens of millions of dollars.
These  developments  pose  obvious  challenges  for  innovation.  Traditional 
models  based  on  a  distinction  between  publicly  funded  pure  research  and 
commercial  development  based  on  patents  and  other  forms  of  intellectual 
property  no  longer  appear  relevant  to  the  needs  of  a  networked  economy 
depending  heavily  on  amateur  production.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to 
consider the role of innovation policy in such an economy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 is a summary of the evolution 
of models of innovation in the 19th and 20th centuries while Section 2 deals with 
the  21st  century  model  of  innovation,  focusing  on  the  recent  convergence  of 3
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technical and cultural innovation. Section 3 is a discussion the role of amateur 
production. Section 4 deals with the economics of network innovation. Sections 5 
and 6 develop the implications of recent development for innovation policy. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of future directions for innovation policy.
1. Models of innovation in the 19th and 20th centuries
While  innovation  is  a  continuous  process,  ways  of  thinking  about 
innovation tend to persist long after they are obsolete. The 19th century idea of 
the  individual  inventive  genius,  epitomised  by  Davy  and  Faraday1,  remained 
influential through much of the 20th century long after the rise of large-scale 
research  institutions  and  industrial  research  laboratories.  Meanwhile, 
discussions of, and institutions for, cultural innovation remain in large measure, 
based from models developed in the 19th century2.
The 19th century model of cultural innovation
Both the conceptual framework and the institutional structures associated 
with cultural innovation in contemporary societies can be traced back, in large 
measure, to the first half of the 19th century. The very ideas of art and culture in 
their modern senses emerged in this period (Williams 1988) and were reflected in 
institutional innovations.
The central actor in the 19th century model of cultural innovation is the 
artist,  conceived,  in  the  original  Romantic  vision,  as  an  individual  creator  of 
works of art. Art, viewed until this point as broadly synonymous with such terms 
as ‘skill’ and ‘craft’, is conceived as a transcendent category of human activity, 
common  to  all  societies,  but  produced  only  by  a  handful  of  exceptional 
individuals, and confined to a specific set of forms of expression, most notably 
painting, sculpture and certain forms of music and literature.
1 For biographical details, see Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Faraday and 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Humphry_Davy). 
2 More precisely, from Hobsbawm’s (1995) ‘long 19th century’ which ran from the French 




Although art and artists are rarely described in such explicitly Romantic 
terms nowadays, these conceptions are still embedded in the cultural institutions 
inherited from the 19th century.
Copyright  provides  one  notable  example.  Although  copyrights  have 
become tradeable property rights, their terms are everywhere tied to the lifetime 
of the original creator. In some countries, the alienation of copyright is further 
limited by moral rights and rights to receive payment on resale.
The other major sets of institutions, largely created in the 19th century3, 
and  still  highly  influential,  are  public  institutions  such  as  art  galleries  and 
symphony orchestras. These institutions preserve and interpret the creations of 
those individuals recognised as great artists, for presentation to the public. They 
embody  19th  century  notions  about  the  development  of  art  and  culture,  the 
relationship between culture and society and so on.
The 20th century model of technical innovation
The process of technical innovation in the 19th century was seen in terms 
similar to those associated with cultural innovation. The central focus was on the 
work  of  individual  inventors  and  researchers,  commonly  with  little  or  no 
specifically scientific training. Humphry Davy began his career as an apothecary 
and Michael Faraday as a bookbinder.
By the early 20th century, this model was displaced by an industrialised 
process  of  innovation.  The  first  major  step  in  this  process  was  the  rise  of  the 
research university and the development of a large class of technically trained 
workers, beginning in Germany in the second half of the 19th century. In the 
20th century, pure scientific research had become the preserve of universities and 
specialist research institutes.
The second major step was the development of corporate forms of business 
organisation, which allowed research and development to become an organised 
3  list of foundation dates Rijksmuseum Amsterdam 1800, Louvre 1793, Prado 1891, National Gallery 1824, 
Metropolitan Musem of Art 1870, La Scala, New York Met 1880, 1842 the New York Philharmonic and the 
Vienna Philharmonic were formed, and in 1858, the Hallé Orchestra5
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business  activity,  operated  on  industrial  lines  (Chandler  1977).  The  transition 
may  be  seen  in  the  career  of  Thomas  Edison,  who  began  as  an  individual 
inventor, but established both a string of corporations that survive today and, in 
1876 at Menlo Park, the first industrial research laboratory.
During  the  20th  century,  innovation  proceeded  fairly  broadly  across  a 
wide range of industries. If any industry was seen as characterising technical 
progress  in  the  first  75  years  of  the  century  it  was  the  transport  industry. 
References to the Jet Age and Space Age were commonplace as descriptions of 
technological advance.
The 20th century model of innovation brought forth, and was explained by, 
theories of public goods and intellectual property. The central idea of the public 
goods theory is that the benefits of   ‘fundamental’ or ‘pure’ research cannot be 
privately  appropriate.  Hence,  the  optimal  policy  is  public  funding  of  pure 
research,  the  results  of  which  are  made  freely  available.  By  contrast,  applied 
research and development can be embodied in new goods and services, protected 
by intellectual property in the form of patents. 
In  the  late  20th  century,  strenuous  attempts  were  made  to  extend  the 
scope of patents and other forms of intellectual property. However, even as this 
process  reached  its  zenith  with  such  measures  as  the  Agreement  on  Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights(TRIPS)4, negotiated in 1994, and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, passed by the US Congress in 19985 and 
the, it was undermined by technological and social developments that rendered 
the whole idea of intellectual property questionable, and arguably obsolete.
2. Innovation in the 21st century
The pattern of innovation in the 21st century is radically different from 
that of the 20th in several important ways. First, it is highly uneven. In most 





substantially.  Technological  progress  is  characterised  largely  by  incremental 
improvements to mature products. This is most evident in relation to transport. 
The  Boeing  747  ‘jumbo  jet’  revolutionised  air  travel  when  it  was 
introduced in the 1960s. Forty years later, the 747 is still the workhorse of long-
haul passenger travel, and its successors, such as the Airbus A380 and Boeing 
B787 represent only modest advances. 
The  same  point  may  be  made  about  the  range  of  household  consumer 
durables such as refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and dishwasher. Not only has 
there been little fundamental change in these products, but there have been no 
significant new products since the microwave oven in the 1970s. The situation in 
much of the service sector is the same.
By contrast, in computing and telecommunications, the rate of progress 
(which was already fast) has accelerated dramatically since the late 1980. The 
convergence  of  computing  and  telecommunications  in  the  Internet  has 
fundamentally transformed every activity it has touched.
Creative and technical innovation
The  growth  of  the  Internet  has  been  made  possible  by  technological 
improvements in the speed and power of communication and computation. But 
the growth of the Internet owes as much to cultural as to technical innovation. 
The Internet itself is not a physical network, but a set of institutions and cultural 
practices. 
At  the  lowest  level,  the  Internet  Protocols  embody  a  set  of  rules  about 
connections  between  hosts,  and  the  way  in  which  data  may  be  transferred 
between them. As Lessig (1999) observes, a crucial feature of the Internet is the 
minimal  set  of  assumptions  required  for  connection.  This  allows  for  maximal 
flexibility in innovation by users, at the cost of forgoing any significant central 
provision of services.
The open nature of the Internet rapidly gave rise to developments such as 
newsgroups where many of the cultural practices (good and bad) that are central 
to the Internet were developed. 7
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A second, and arguably even more crucial set of cultural innovations arose 
with  the  development  of  the  World  Wide  Web,  originating  from  a  hypertext 
language (HTML) designed to allow physicists to share data and working papers. 
The  open  and  flexible  nature  of  the  Web,  and  the  fact  that  it  was  based  on 
royalty-free  technology  ensured  that  it  quickly  displaced  alternative  protocols 
such as Gopher (owned by the University of Minnesota which sought to charge for 
its use).
The rise of the Internet to its current position of dominance was not an 
automatic  outcome  of  technical  progress.  Rather  it  reflected  the  fact  that  the 
cultural  structure  of  the  Internet  made  it  more  attractive  than  competing 
alternatives,  including  a  range  of  commercial  networks,  such  as  Delphi  and 
GENie
These competitors disappeared (or merged into the Internet) so long ago 
that  most  current  users  are  unaware  that  there  ever  existed  any  alternative. 
Similarly, for many users, the Internet is, simply, the Web, and there is little 
awareness  of  other  Internet  protocols  such  as  FTP  for  file  transfer  and  the 
various protocols that support (non-Web based) email. 
3. Amateurs
The Web has given rise to a huge range of cultural and formal innovation. 
In contrast to the 20th century model of innovation, many of the most significant 
innovations  have  been  driven  by  amateurs  seeking  new  ways  to  communicate 
with friends, colleagues and the world at large. The role of amateurs in creative 
innovation has been explored by a number of recent writers including Benkler 
2004, 2006), Bruns (2005), Hunter and Quiggin (2008) and Leadbeater and Miller 
(2004).
As Hunter and Quiggin (2008) note, a wide range of motives lead people to 
contribute  to  amateur  collaborative  innovation.  Possible  motives  include 
altruism, self-expression, advocacy of particular political or social views, display 
of technical expertise and social interaction. Different motives will be dominant 
in different situations. 8
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In  general,  these  motives  are  complementary  or  at  least  mutually 
consistent. For example, an altruistic desire to improve open source software will 
be complemented by enjoyment of a technically challenging task, and by a desire 
for the admiration of a peer group.
However,  motives  like  these  do  not  co-exist  well  with  a  profit  motive.   
Benkler (2004) notes the absence of monetary side payments in the case of car-
pooling  and  this  is  typical  of  co-operative  endeavors  of  various  kinds.  The 
observation  that  financial  motives  may  conflict  with  other  motives  has  been 
discussed  at  length  in  the  literature  on  motivational  crowding  out  (Frey, 
Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger 1997). 
Hunter and Quiggin (2008) further argue that it is necessary to consider 
the social context of monetary interactions.  Monetary interactions naturally give 
rise to rational calculus of action in which there is no sensible alternative to the 
pursuit of one’s own interests. This is because markets create opportunities for 
systematic  arbitrage  that  do  not  apply  in  other  contexts.  Profit-oriented 
participants  can  make  systematic  gains  at  the  expense  of  those  who  seek  to 
behave  in  an  altruistic  manner  or  who  anticipate,  but  do  not  contract  for, 
reciprocity  in contributions.
It follows that amateur innovation is unlikely to be promoted by policies 
that sharpen financial incentives. On the contrary, the greater the potential for 
well-informed market participants to extract profits from a given activity, the less 
willing amateurs will be to make uncompensated contributions.
4. The economics of network innovations
The changing patterns of innovation discussed above are a reflection of the 
increasing importance of networks at all stages of the process of innovation. With 
declining  communications  cost,  it  is  possible  for  valuable  innovations  to  arise 
from the efforts of large number of individual contributors, who may be physically 
separate and not subject to significant external coordination. 
The  Internet  is  both  the  most  important  single  example  of  a  network-
generated innovation and the basis for the subsequent innovations. Among the 9
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most  notable  are  the  open-source  operating  system  Linux,  and  Wikipedia,  the 
online encyclopedia that has become, in the space of six years, the most widely 
used reference source on the Internet and, as far as such things can be measured, 
the most widely used in human history.
A less obvious example is the ‘blogosphere’. The blogosphere is more than 
the collection of 50 or 100 million individual blogs and the supporting software 
and  hardware.  A  crucial  feature  of  its  significance  is  the  set  of  links,  social 
structures  and  conventions  it  has  generated,  which  largely  determine  the 
collective capacity of blogs to influence discussion of political, social and cultural 
concerns.
From an economic viewpoint, the critical feature of networks is that value 
accrues to the network as a whole and cannot, in general, be reduced to the sum 
of individual contributions. The value of a network depends both on its size and 
on its topology.
Economic analysis of large-scale networks typically assume that the value 
of a network is determined by the number of nodes that are connected. As long as 
the value increases more rapidly than the number of nodes, each new connection 
generates  a  benefit  to  existing  users,  referred  to  in  welfare  economics  as  a 
‘positive  externality’.  For  example,  a  new  connection  to  a  telephone  network 
provides the person being connected with the ability to call others and to receive 
calls. This not only benefits the new connection but existing users of the phone 
service who might want to call them.
More recently, there has been a good deal of interest in smaller networks, 
and here attention has focused mainly on the topology, that is, on the pattern of 
links that sustain the network. Depending on the benefits to individual members, 
the  network  may  or  may  not  be  sustainable.  In  general,  the  distribution  of 
benefits required to sustain the network bears no clear relationship to the value 
contributed by particular users.
Both points may easily be observed in relation to the Internet. The value 
of the Internet as a whole, and of its various components, depends heavily on the 10
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number of users, but the cost of access for particular users does not take account 
of benefits that may accrue to others. 
As regards topology, the ranking given by Google depends primarily on the 
pattern of links to particular pages. The capacity  to derive financial benefits from 
programs such as Google’s AdSense also depends critically on network topology 
and the pattern of visits. Any correlation between the capacity of a site to capture 
AdSense revenue and the value of the site to its users is indirect and tangential 
at best.
In  summary,  innovation  in  a  network  economy  typically  requires 
contributions from widely distributed sources and yields benefits that are diffuse 
and hard to capture. There is no easy way of relating the rewards of innovation to 
the  value  of  individual  contributions.  It  follows  that  innovation  policies  based 
primarily  on  enhancing  the  capacity  to  capture  such  rewards  are  unlikely  to 
prove effective. 
5. What role for innovation policy?
What is the role for innovation policy in promoting network innovation? It 
seems  clear  that  existing  models  are  in  need  of  substantial  revision,  to  take 
account  of  the  convergence  of  technical  and  creative  innovation  and  the 
increasingly central role of amateur and user-based innovation.
Innovation and the market
Market  processes  are  unlikely  to  generate  adequate  support  for 
innovation, or to promote valuable innovations over trivial or even destructive 
innovations.  It  has  long  been  clear  that  market  models  based  on  payment  for 
content,  including  text,  audiovisual  material,  data,  and  net-based  software 
services,  have  only  a  marginal  role  to  play  in  a  networked  economy.  Apple’s 
iTunes  service  is  a  notable  success  among  a  sea  of  failures,  but  attempts  to 
replicate it have proved almost entirely unavailing.
The  vast  majority  of  market  returns  from  internet  services  are  tied  to 
advertising. The most successful model is that of Google. Unfortunately, the sale 
of  advertising  provides  a  prime  illustration  of  the  point  that  the  capacity  to 11
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capture  returns  from  the  internet  bears  only  an  indirect  and  unreliable 
relationship to beneficial innovation or to the provision of useful services.
Under  the  advertising  model,  it  is  critical  to  obtain  a  high  rank  in 
searches from Google and other engines. Rank is defined by large numbers of 
incoming  links.  This  fact  has  given  rise  to  numerous  innovations  aimed  at 
increasing the rank of particular sites. Given the zero sum nature of competition 
for rankings (an increase in ranking for one site must mean a loss for others) such 
innovation yields no net gains. 
Worse, many of the techniques used to increase rank are actively harmful, 
promoting various forms of spam. For example, spammers may use blog hosting 
services to set up fake blogs (splogs) linking to their own site or may submit large 
numbers  of  spurious  comments  to  blogs  and  other  sites  that  allow  visitors  to 
comment. As with other forms of spam, spurious traffic of this kind forms a large 
proportion of total traffic on many sites, and creates a large load on servers and 
on administrators.
In summary, there is no reason to expect that market forces will provide 
appropriate  incentives  for  innovation.  Neither  the  resources  devoted  to 
innovation  nor  the  way  in  which  those  resources  are  allocated  is  likely  to  be 
socially  optimal.  Hence,  there  are  potential  benefits  from  a  well-designed 
innovation policy.
What not to do
The  first  problem  in  innovation  policy  is  to  stop  doing  things  that  are 
clearly counterproductive. Throughout the period of collaborative innovation, the 
main thrust of reform in innovation policy has been actively counterproductive 
though, fortunately, largely ineffectual. 
The key idea of this policy thrust has been ‘strong intellectual property’, 
the  idea  that  all  kinds  of  ideas,  modes  of  expression  and  technical  processes 
should  be  subject  to  unfettered  private  ownership,  through  devices  such  as 
copyright, patents and licensing. Limits on the duration of of such rights have 12
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been attacked through extensions in the term of copyright and through devices 
such as evergreening.
The supposed justification for these measures was initially to encourage 
innovation by allowing innovators to reap rewards through exclusive rights to 
exploit them. While economists have given some support to this idea, they have 
pointed out that these incentive benefits must be traded off against the social 
costs of monopoly rights. As was shown by the amicus curiae briefs in the case of 
Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 (2003)6 economic opinion is virtually unanimous 
in  the  view  that  the  balance  has  been  shifted  too  far  in  the  direction  of 
intellectual  property.  Economists  increasingly  stress  the  public  good  nature  of 
information and the benefits to be derived from such processes as open source 
innovation.
In  the  absence  of  strong  economic  arguments,  advocates  of  strong 
intellectual property have relied heavily on legal and ethical claims, essentially 
based on the assumption that since patents and copyrights are called ‘intellectual 
property’ they have the same status as ordinary property rights over goods. The 
familiar  advertisementts  in  which  ‘stealing’  (actually  copying)  a  video  clip  is 
compared to stealing a car are an illustration of a simile that can be extended to 
almost  any  intellectual  activity  over  which  someone  seeks  to  exert  a  property 
claim.
Strong  intellectual  property  regimes  represent  an  obstacle  to  network 
innovation. The problem is most obvious in relation to amateur and open-source 
innovation, which has played a central role in the development of the networked 
economy. Amateurs have little or nothing to gain from intellectual property rights 
and are correspondingly unwilling, and often unable, to pay others for the right to 
6 One such brief was signed by 17 economists, including five Nobel Prize winners, and covering a 
wide range of viewpoints from interventionist to strongly free market. The full list is: George 
A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy F. Bresnahan, James M. Buchanan, Ronald H. Coase, 
Linda R. Cohen, Roy T. Englert, Jr, Milton Friedman, Jerry R. Green, Robert W. Hahn, 
Thomas W. Hazlett, C. Scott Hemphill, Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, Richard Schmalensee, 




use  patented  or  copyright  items  that  derive  much  of  their  value  from  the 
collective contributions that make up the network.
Even in for-profit enterprises, intellectual property rights such as patents 
are widely seen as a barrier to innovation. The ease of filing patents on ideas that 
are, at most, minor variants on existing techniques means that even simple steps 
to improve software run the risk of infringing on intellectual property. On the 
other  hand,  the  actual  revenue  that  can  be  obtained  by  licensing  intellectual 
property is typically modest at best. 
Formal  and  informal  systems  of  patent  pooling  overcome  many  of  the 
problems. Innovative firms can make use of the ideas of others, while sharing 
their  own  ideas.  However,  this  system  has  been  undermined  by  the  recent 
emergence of ‘patent trolls’, firms that specialise in accumulating patents and 
suing actual innovators for (often highly dubious) infringements in the hope that 
their  victims  will  prefer  to  pay  to  settle  cases  rather  than  put  up  with  long-
running disruption and legal costs.7 
Fortunately, it appears that the push to strengthen intellectual property 
is  failing.  The  most  prominent  instance  of  patent  trolling,  the  SCO  Group’s 
attempt to assert ownership over Unix and Linux code, an action financed by 
Linux rival Microsoft, ended in failure on all points and bankruptcy for SCO.8 
Courts have become less willing to sustain patent claims.
Social attitudes have similarly changed. The majority of people routinely 
violate copyright and licensing prohibitions, such as prohibitions on ‘ripping’ CDs 
to digital media. Recent attempts to strengthen copyright law in Canada have 
provoked  strong  opposition,  particularly  among  younger  and  more  highly 
educated voters (Angus Reid Strategies 2008). 
Provisions of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement that strengthened 
intellectual  property  rights  were  similarly  controversial.  The  Australian 
government  was  forced  by  public  opposition  to  amend  the  legislation 
implementing the Agreement in order to restrict patent evergreening and protect 
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll
8 The case is documented in detail at Groklaw http://www.groklaw.net/14
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its  ability  to  purchase  pharmaceutical  products  at  low  cost  under  the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. 
Finally,  and  most  importantly,  the  emergence  of  alternatives  to  strong 
intellectual property such as open source software and the Creative Commons 
license has changed the default assumptions under which innovation takes place. 
The  volume  of  material  available  under  explicit  Creative  Commons  conditions 
has grown massively. More generally, despite the legal presumption, introduced 
in  the  United  States  in  the  1970s,  that  published  material  is  automatically 
subject  to  copyright,  the  norm  of  free  sharing  has  emerged  as  the  default 
presumption for items published on the Internet. Attempts to restrict access to 
paying subscribers, or to prevent republication have largely been abandoned as 
counterproductive. Such restrictions discourage the inward links that are crucial 
to high rankings from search engines such as Google.
If strong intellectual property, often presented as the market model for 
innovation,  is  undesirable,  the  polar  opposite  of  central  planning  is  no  more 
appealing. Attempts to predict and control the path of network innovation have 
proved ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst. The fiasco surrounding 
attempts  to  manage  the  shift  to  digital  television  in  Australia  (Lebihan  2001) 
provides one of many examples.
6. Some general principles
It is impossible, at this stage, to formulate a detailed policy program for 
networked  innovation.  However,  some  general  principles  and  policy  directions 
can be indicated.   First, it is necessary to encourage creativity in all its forms. 
Since  the  outcomes  of  creativity  cannot  be  prescribed  in  advance,  policies  to 
encourage creativity must rely on providing space for creativity, including access 
to the necessary resources, free time for creative workers to pursue their own 
projects  and  the  communications  networks  necessary  to  facilitate  creative 
collaborations. 
The coalescence of technical and cultural innovation suggests the need for 
a  hybrid  between  models  of  support  for  scientific  research  and  technical 15
16
17
innovation  and  those  that  have  been  used  to  promote  cultural  innovation, 
particularly in the creative arts. 
Another important direction of support for network innovation is that of 
public  contributions  to  the  commons.  Moves  to  extend  claims  for  intellectual 
property over publicly-funded creative works should be abandoned and replaced 
by a commitment to make all such work available either as part of the public 
domain  or  on  free-sharing  conditions  such  as  those  of  the  Creative  Commons 
license.
Public  cultural  institutions  such  as  the  Australian  Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) have long played a major role in supporting the public good 
model  of  creative  production.  This  model  needs  to  be  extended.  Gruen  (2008) 
provides a number of useful suggestions, beginning with the development of a 
freely  accessible  archive  on  the  World  Wide  Web,  and  continuing  with 
suggestions of ways in which the ABC could help to develop the resources of Web 
2.0 and community broadcasting. 
Much of this seems like common sense. However, the required measures 
run  directly  against  some  of  the  main  policy  directions  associated  with  the 
dominant  policy  reform  movements  of  recent  decades,  including  market 
liberalism  (also  called  neoliberalism  or,  in  Australia,  economic  rationalism), 
managerialism  and  the  ‘new  public  sector  management  model’.  The  policy 
reforms associated these movements are characterised by increased reliance on 
incentives,  accompanied  by  an  increased  focus  on  accountability,  and 
measurement of outcomes against objectives determined by strategic planning. 
The implied goal is to match the outcomes of an idealised competitive market, 
either through actual privatisation or through the adoption by the public sector of 
practices which deliver market-like outcomes.
In  view  of  the  collaborative,  creativity-driven  character  of  network 
innovation, such policies are likely to be at best ineffectual and at worst actively 
counterproductive. Nevertheless, they are deeply embedded in the thinking that 




The convergence of information technology and telecommunications has 
brought about radical changes in the process of cultural and technical innovation. 
These changes are likely to continue, and even accelerate, in the future.
Innovation  policy  must  change  in  response.  The  20th  century  model  in 
which  publicly-funded  pure  research  was  converted  into  commercial  products 
through corporate research and development is no longer adequate. Innovation 
facility  must  facilitate  and  support  amateur,  collaborative,  networks  that 
generate  both  technical  and  cultural  innovations  driven,  in  large  measure,  by 
non-monetary concerns.
As  technical  and  cultural  innovations  are  increasingly  intertwined, 
cultural policy must be aligned with innovation policy. The ultimate object should 
be  a  creative  society,  in  which  opportunities  for  cultural,  technical  and  social 
innovations are open to all. 
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